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With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea and its natural resources became
a source of contention for Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. The
underlying issue is paradoxical in light of its misleading simplicity – is the Caspian a sea or
a lake? Throughout the article, we present proof that this question does matter and the
answer should be given in the near future unless the world wishes to witness a cascade of
conﬂicts. Even though the establishment of an international legal regime would place the
region within the purview of UNCLOS and the international rule of law, thus ensuring
safety and stability, the littoral states have pursued their own economic and political
interests, resulting in a plethora of competing legal positions. As we evaluate the main
points of disagreement and their respective impact on the status quo, the history of the
region plays a prominent role. Consequently, the bordering countries choose to adhere to
prevailing methods of dealing with issues of similar complexity: power competition over
the resources of small states, negotiation and power politics instead of international rule of
law, and protection that disguises coercion. Will the littoral states ever abandon the
temptation of hostile geopolitical games and embark on a process of peaceful, open
negotiations? This article seeks to help resolve this dilemma while analysing the failure of
public international law to amend the situation, the legal chaos reigning in the region
arising from the need to exploit the resources and construct pipelines to export them, and
how the post-Soviet sphere has experienced a weakening of public international law as its
doors open to the global petroleum market.
Copyright  2010, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.Is the Caspian Sea a sea? No question could seem sil-
lier. The Caspian has been called a sea since its discoveryand
ﬁrst description in ancient times. The bordering states –
Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan –
call it a sea in their respective languages. TheUnitedNations
Group of Experts on Geographical Names recognizes theon Geldern).
Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyabody as a sea.1 Its waters are salty, more so to the south than
to the north.
Yet the Caspian Sea has some unique features that make
its identity problematic. It is an inland sea that can only be
accessed through Russia’s Volga River and the canals1 Note, though, that the UNGEGN follows the principle that “the owner
decides” in standardizing place names: “The goal of the United Nations is
to establish usable and consistent written forms of toponyms and their
applications throughout the world. This depends heavily on the ofﬁcial
use of names within each country. The Group of Experts deﬁnes national
geographical names standardization as the standardization of
geographical names within the area of a national entity, such as a State”
(UNGEGN, 2006, 10). Thus it is of little help in instances of disputed
sovereignty.
ng University. Produced and distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.
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Azov. It is supplied by freshwater sources and has no salt-
water connection to the open seas of the world. The
determinations of the U.N. Group of Experts on
Geographical Names have no legal status. In fact, a series of
bi-lateral treaties between the Soviet Union and Iran
identiﬁed the Caspian Sea as a lake, the resources of which
should be divided equally between them.2 If the Caspian
Sea is in fact a large salty lake under the jurisdiction of its
littoral states, or of Russia and Iran alone, then the United
Nations and international law have no jurisdiction over its
waters. The seemingly silly question – is the Caspian Sea
a sea? – takes on great import.
Of practical interest is access to and exploitation of the
vast resources of the Caspian. Until recently the primary
resources of interest were the rich ﬁsh stocks of the sea,
including the sturgeon and its valuable caviar. In recent
years, overﬁshing and the discovery of vast petroleum
deposits have eclipsed the ﬁsheries andmade international
oil exploitation the paramount issue. If the Caspian is an
inland sea, its waters and resources are regulated by the
United Nations Convention on the Seas (hereinafter
UNCLOS), open to all the littoral states, and accessible to
these states and the great multinational petroleum corpo-
rations. If the Caspian is just a lake, its waters and resources
should be divided by the littoral states, and are not open to
the international community. Moreover, if the Soviet–
Iranian treaties are still in force, then Russia (as successor
state to the Soviet Union) and Iran are masters of its waters,
a solution that few other states would care to accept.
Unclear provisions in the UNCLOS and the Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties
(1980) (hereinafter Vienna, 1980) provide no answers to
these questions. Thus the question – is the Caspian Sea
a sea? – points to an even larger issue than those raised by
the oil. We must ask, almost two decades after the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union and the creation of the newly
independent states, whether international law has
extended its reach into the interior of the former Soviet
Union.1. Framing the issues
The unmistakeable conclusion from recent negotiations
and debates over exploitation of the Caspian is that the
interior of the former Soviet Union does not function as
a fully international space, and that it functions more as an
“informal” empire outside of the United Nation regimes of
public international law.3 In fact the status of the Caspian
Sea since 1991 indicates that this trend has become
increasingly pronounced since the year 2000. If the newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union were more
inclined to assert their membership in the international2 See Treaty of Friendship (1922, 405–407) (Articles 7 & 11); and the
Soviet-Iranian Trade and Navigation Agreement (1940, 419); Butler (1971,
101–103), explains the legal regime governing the Caspian during the
Soviet period.
3 On the notion of “informal empire” as it arose in connection with the
British Empire, see Gallagher and Robinson (1953).community from independence until 2000, and to adhere
to principles of public international law in their relations,
a variety of pressures have moved them in the opposite
direction more recently. Membership in the international
community and adherence to international legal norms
carries with it obligations that the newly independent
states might not wish to accept – human rights law being
a salient example – and public international law is frus-
tratingly unclear precisely where it should provide answers
to the Caspian Sea issue. As the potential for petroleum
exploitation became urgent in the years after 2000, the
need for a clear-cut solution that beneﬁted the littoral
states became pressing. Thus the states turned to methods
based on the traditional tools of geopolitical power –
diplomacy, negotiation, self-interest and mutual advantage
– and away from the principles of public international law.
On one hand, this has only exacerbated the trend for the
states bordering the Caspian to step away from interna-
tional legal regimes, a trend encouraged by their increas-
ingly authoritarian nature. On the other hand, it has
allowed the states to seek solutions underwhich the littoral
states can share sovereignty over the Caspian and divide its
resources among themselves.
The division of the Caspian, with large economic bene-
ﬁts at stake, has not necessarily been amicable, and the
diminution of the role of public international law has given
greater roles to the principles of power and self-interest.
What we propose to do in the remainder of this article is to
show how and why public international law has failed to
provide solutions to the most pressing issues; what the
interests and legal positions of the primary littoral states
are; and how the urgency of exploiting the resources of the
Caspian and constructing pipelines to export them have
lead to irresolvable wrangling and a rush to grab the
resources. In the end we seek to show that the entry onto
the global petroleum market has, paradoxically, led to
a weakening of public international law in the post-Soviet
space.
2. United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
International waters are governed by the United Nations
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the international agreement that
resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (Law of the Sea, 1983). The convention
deﬁnes the rights and responsibilities of nations in their
use of theworld’s oceans, and establishes guidelines for the
division and exploitation of ocean resources, protection of
the environment, and management of marine natural
resources. The Convention was signed in 1982 and came
into force in 1994. 158 countries and the European
Community have joined in the Convention. Most of the
provisions of UNCLOS are regarded as a codiﬁcation of
customary international law, and are thus binding on all
nations, even those that have not signed or ratiﬁed it
(Nordquist, 1995, 173–174).
UNCLOS is public international law, and falls under the
jurisdiction of international courts and arbitrational bodies.
In its Preamble, it states that “the area of the seabed and
ocean ﬂoor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the
4 For a Soviet-era defense of the right of free access for land-locked
states, written before the former Soviet republics fell into this category,
see Golytsin (1978, 29–45).
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tation of which shall be carried out for the beneﬁt of
mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical
location of States”. (emphasis added) All other interna-
tional waters, i.e. waters bordering on more than one state,
are governed by admiralty law, the often distinct body of
law that is a combination of domestic maritime law and
international law governing the relationships between
private entities operating vessels on the oceans. Admiralty
law falls under the jurisdiction of domestic courts. Thus the
debate over the status of the Caspian Sea can be distilled to
the question of whether it falls under UNCLOS or the
collective admiralty laws of the littoral, or bordering states.
If the answer is the latter, then these states are free to come
to mutual agreements over the use and exploitation of the
Caspian without regard to the “beneﬁt of mankind as
a whole”; or if they cannot come to agreement, then each
state is free to create its own admiralty laws and regula-
tions, even if those rules conﬂict with the laws of other
littoral states.
Public international law is unclear as to two important
questions: ﬁrst, whether UNCLOS governs the Caspian Sea;
and second, whether some of the former Soviet states are
bound by UNCLOS. Part IV, Section I, Articles 86–89 of
UNCLOS declare that the high seas are open to all states,
coastal or land-locked, that no state can claim sovereignty
over any part of the high seas, and that all states enjoy
freedom of navigation and overﬂight, the freedom to lay
submarine cables and pipelines, subject to certain respon-
sibilities, the freedom to construct artiﬁcial islands and
other installations (read oil rigs here); and the freedom of
ﬁshing, subject to conditions. Article 95 states that
warships on the high seas have complete immunity from
the jurisdiction of any State other than the ﬂag State;
violation of this immunity constitutes an act of war. Article
88 states that the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful
purposes, a stipulation that clearly does not apply to times
of war. Were any waters of the Caspian classiﬁed as high
seas, the prospects would be truly chilling for the littoral
states, most glaringly for the Russian Federation and Iran.
The high seas provisions of UNCLOS could then be invoked
to conjure visions of western oil rights, ﬁshing boats and
even warships patrolling their once sovereign internal
waters.
Unfortunately, UNCLOS offers no deﬁnition of the high
seas, only deﬁnitions of what they are not. Article 86 states
that high seas include “all parts of the sea that are not
included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial
sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic
waters of an archipelagic State”. These zones excluded from
the high seas provisions allow for full or partial sovereignty
of the coastal states, including the right to exploit the
resources of the seabed and ﬁshing rights. International
shipping has the right of free passage beyond the twelve-
mile zone of territorial waters, and is still subject to state
regulations in four speciﬁed areas (pollution, taxation,
customs, and immigration) in the adjacent twelve-mile
contiguous zone. Beyond that, the coastal states reserve full
and exclusive rights of economic exploitation of the waters
and seabed reserves in a two-hundred mile exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) extending from their shorelines, or“base lines” in the language of the treaty; and further
exclusive rights to exploit the mineral and non-living
material in the subsoil of the continental shelf extending
beyond the EEZ, limited to a zone extending 350miles from
their base lines. Importantly for the land-locked Caspian
states, Part VII, Article 90 of UNCLOS provides that “Every
State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail
ships ﬂying its ﬂag on the high seas”.4
If the Caspian is a sea subject to UNCLOS, the collective
exclusive economic zones of the littoral states encompass
its entire surface and seabed. The Caspian Sea has a surface
area of approximately 370,000–425,000 square kilometers,
depending on estimates and changing sea levels from
evaporation and inﬂow of water; its north to south length is
approximately 1200 km, and its east–west width does not
exceed 250 km. Its average depth is 184 m, with
amaximumdepth of 1025m. The UNCLOS rules for division
of EEZs when these zones overlap, as they do in the Cas-
pian, provide distinct advantages for Azerbaijan, and
a disadvantage for Iran. If the Caspian was divided
according to UNCLOS, some of its largest oil and gas
deposits would be situated in the Azerbaijani zone
(Mehdiyoun, 2000) Additionally, these deposits are located
in relatively shallow portions of the Caspian, allowing for
easy offshore drilling. This is an important factor since the
hydrocarbon reserves of Azerbaijan exceed four billion
tons, including the country into the list the biggest oil
regions of the world. Secondly, Azerbaijan has placed
exploitation of these oil ﬁelds at the top of its agenda by
portraying them as the foundation of its future prosperity.
As former president Heydar Aliyev mentioned in one of his
speeches, “The availability of the signiﬁcant oil and gas
reserves in Azerbaijan is the fortune of our people and the
major factor in the development of the country for the
welfare of the people and their present and future” (Heydar
Aliyev Foundation, 2007). Aliyev was the one who infused
life into the oil industry of the republic after coming to
presidency in 1993. Nostalgia for the times when
Azerbaijan occupied ﬁrst place in world production and
processing of oil, accounting for 50% of the global oil
production, as well as the fact that it supplied 75% of Soviet
oil during the Second World War, making a great contri-
bution to the victory over fascism, made the possession of
a sector of the Caspian an integral part of the new Azer-
baijani national identity. It is no surprise that in the 1990s
the country argued adamantly in favor of applying UNCLOS
to the Caspian Sea, thus aiming to speed up the develop-
ment of oil projects off its coast (Sanei, 2001, 788). UNCLOS
would provide for division of the water and seabed into
national sectors roughly proportional to the length of each
littoral state’s coastline, with Azerbaijan getting 20.7% of
the Caspian (Dunlap, 2004, 121). The only state that sup-
ported Azerbaijan’s initiative was Kazakhstan, whose
motivation was the same.
The issue is further complicated by the inclusion of Part
IX of UNCLOS, which deﬁnes and regulates enclosed or
5 Emphasis added. In its commentaries to the ﬁrst UNCLOS (1958), the
International Law Commission left the all-important issue of access to
ports unanswered: “The Commission considered the case of areas of the
sea situated off the junction of two or more adjacent States, where the
exercise of rights in the contiguous zone by one State would not leave any
free access to the ports of another State except through that zone. The
Commission, recognizing that in such cases the exercise of rights in the
contiguous zone by one State may unjustiﬁably obstruct trafﬁc to or from
a port of another State, considered that in the case referred to it would be
necessary for the two States to conclude a prior agreement on the exer-
cise of rights in the contiguous zone. In view of the exceptional nature of
the case, however, the Commission did not consider it necessary to
include a formal rule to this effect” International Law Commission (1956,
295).
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a “enclosed or semi-enclosed sea” as a “sea surrounded by
two or more States and connected to another sea or the
ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily
of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two
or more coastal States”. What the deﬁnition does not tell us
is whether a body of water can be both semi-enclosed sea
and high seas, and which if any of the other zonal provi-
sions apply to semi-enclosed seas. The convention does not
deﬁne what a “narrow outlet” might mean, and whether it
must be a natural geographic feature or can be a system of
rivers and connecting canals such as the Volga-Don Canal
system, which connects the Caspian to the Black Sea, the
Baltic Sea and the Sea of Azov.
Article 123 of UNCLOS paradoxically creates interna-
tional law for semi-enclosed seas and then cedes jurisdic-
tion over them to the littorial states. Its weak provisions
mandate that the bordering states “should cooperate with
each other in the exercise of their rights and in the
performance of their duties under this Convention”
(emphasis added), providing no framework for that coop-
eration, no organizational structure for the cooperation, no
jurisdiction over the question of whether a body of water is
a lake or sea. Neither does it address the relationship of
maritime (international) and admiralty (domestic) law on
these waters. In many ways, Articles 122 and 123 so
confuse the issue that they might even be worse than
excluding such bodies from the UNCLOS. They create one
more issue for dispute between states, creating also a dual
system of adjudication, domestic and international, that
has international law determine what a semi-enclosed sea
is, but leaves all other questions to the admiralty law of the
bordering states.
One question sorely in need of clear rules and adjudi-
cation procedures is the right of passage to semi-enclosed
seas. If the Caspian is in fact a sea that includes waters
navigable by international shipping, how will those ships
reach the Caspian? And for land-locked states such as
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, how can they
ship any resources that they have harvested from the Cas-
pian to customers around the world? Since the Caspian
lacks a direct outlet to the ocean, and is linked to the Black
and Baltic Seas through the Volga and a series of canals and
other rivers, is Russia obliged to allow the land-locked
states to navigate its internal waters? And if it is, is it also
obliged to allow the ships of all foreign states to navigate its
rivers to reach Caspian resources they have purchased from
the land-locked states? If so, the mere thought of Russia
having to allow possible “Trojan horses” to cruise through
its territory would be unpleasant indeed.
Of particular relevance are the right of free access
provisions of Part X, which apply only to land-locked states.
Article 125 provides that “(1) Land-locked States shall have
the right of access to and from the sea for the purpose of
exercising the rights provided for in this Convention
including those relating to the freedom of the high seas and
the common heritage of mankind. To this end, land-locked
States shall enjoy freedomof transit through the territory of
transit States by all means of transport. (2) The terms and
modalities for exercising freedom of transit shall be agreed
between the land-locked States and transit Statesconcerned through bi-lateral, subregional or regional agree-
ments. (3) Transit States, in the exercise of their full sover-
eignty over their territory, shall have the right to take all
measures necessary to ensure that the rights and facilities
provided for in this Part for land-locked States shall in no
way infringe their legitimate interests”.5 The underscored
passages of this article should highlight how contradictory
the rights and privileges it grants are. The article creates an
international obligation, but it mandates bi-lateral or
multi-lateral solutions, and provides few guidelines for
what those solutions should entail. It implies that coastal
states should sacriﬁce some sovereign control of their
territory and ports to land-locked states, but acknowledges
the full sovereignty of coastal states over their territory, and
does not expect them to infringe on their own legitimate
rights – without deﬁning which rights are legitimate.
Combined with the weak obligation that coastal states of
semi-enclosed seas “should cooperate” in Article 123, the
international obligation embodied by UNCLOS can be
distilled to imply that Russia should allow Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to transport the resources
they harvest from the Caspian over Russian land or internal
waters, but that this falls entirely within Russian discretion.
As for the prospect of the warships of other nations
steaming up Russian rivers and canals to reach the Caspian,
this is nowhere foreseen in the UNCLOS framework.
Does Azerbaijan have a right under UNCLOS to use
Russian waterways to bring pipeline construction ships to
the Caspian Sea? And does it have the right to invite
Western companies to do the same? Surely this is an issue
of grave concern to Russian authorities. Russia currently
operates as if it has no international obligation to allow
foreign ships access to the Caspian along its waterways,
but that it may offer access when this is in its interests.
The controlling domestic law, the Russian Inland Water-
ways Act, was passed under Stalin in 1936, when the
Caspian Sea fell almost entirely within the Soviet Union.
Article 5 of the Act declares categorically that “Passage on
the internal waters of Russia under a foreign ﬂag is
forbidden”. The assertion of sovereignty over its inland
waters is entirely within the framework of public inter-
national law; the categorical exclusion of all transit
passage is not. Russia has therefore moved to strengthen
its legal control over its rivers and canals, but has allowed
other states limited access for passage to the Caspian. In
1994, the Yeltsin government imposed speciﬁc restrictions
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Control over shipping on the Volga-Don Canal is a vital
matter of sovereignty and security for the Russian Federa-
tion; and evading the ambiguous obligations of interna-
tional law would give it great leverage in the arena of
geo-petroleum politics. Not only would it be able to hinder
or even halt tanker trafﬁc from the Caspian oil ﬁelds to the
open seas; if the Caspian Sea is in fact not a sea under
international law, Russia would be able to impede
construction of oil pipelines from the oil ﬁelds to the west.
We must recognize that Russian leaders are acting not only
according to the dictates of contemporary petroleum poli-
tics; there are deeply historical barriers to relinquishing full
sovereignty over the territories and cities that link the
Caspian to the Black Sea. The westernmost port of
the Volga-Don system is Rostov-na-Donu. The canal joins
the Volga near Volgograd (Stalingrad), a city whose
strategic importance Russians will never be forget. The
easternmost port of the canal system, 400 km downstream
from Volgograd, is Astrakhan, near where the Volga enters
the Caspian.
Until recently the issue of allowing western oil tankers
down the canal systemwasmooted by the system’s ruinous
condition.6 The infrastructure of the canal ports dates from
Soviet times. On the Black Sea, the leading ports are located
mostly in the present Ukraine, and their cargo facilities are
increasingly obsolete and running far below capacity. Their
facilities lack modern equipment to handle specialized
cargoes. Although the Volga-Don ports can handle modern
container trafﬁc, container-handling facilities are rare on
the Black Sea. While the construction of a pipe line across
the Caspian and through non-Russian territory would seem
to negate this as an issue, ships still need access to the
Caspian to construct and maintain the pipeline. Use of the
internal Russian canal system for oil and gas transport is
also obstructed by weather conditions and the shallowness
of the canals. Deep-drafting oil tankers and heavy-equip-
ment transports cannot navigate the shallow channels of
the canal system, on which only smaller vessels – typically
5000 ton vessels – can be used. Furthermore, the Volga-
Don Canal closes to commercial trafﬁc in early November
and does not reopen until April. Since this is the season of
primary energy demand in Western Europe, the need for
another avenue for energy transport becomes obvious.
Recently though, changes in Russian transport regulations
and the privatization of the region’s port facilities are
making them better able to compete for foreign customers
and investors (Sweeney & Nowek, 1998). The private
operators of the ports have signiﬁcant incentive to open
their facilities to Azerbaijan and its friends. While Russian
vessels pay $5000–$6000 for passage along the waterways,
an Azerbaijani vessel must pay at least $20,000–$25,000 for
passage along the internal waters of Russia (Pike, 2007). To
meet Russian requirements on transit by foreign-ﬂagged
carriers, U.S. exporters used an Azeri-ﬂagged vessel oper-
ated by Azerbaijan’s Caspian Shipping Company, which the
Russian authorities permitted to use its inland waterways6 The following information is drawn from Sweeney and Nowek (1998).(Sweeney & Nowek, 1998). The U.S. and Azerbaijan have
even ﬁgured out how to provide naval military support to
Azerbaijan on the Caspian waters. In 2003, a former Coast
Guard cutter Point Brower was “dedicated” to Azerbaijan
by the U.S. This was in fact the third such ship given to
Azerbaijan, which piloted it to the Caspian across the Black
Sea and Sea of Azov, through the Volga Don canal to the
Caspian Sea, and then to Baku (Pike, 2007).
Many of these outstanding issues could be resolved by
adjudication from an international body outside the control
of the Caspian states. The ﬁrst United Nations Law of the
Sea (1958) provided for the maritime disputes to be
decided by the International Court of Justice. The present
UNCLOS, created in 1982, formed an International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, a United Nations body with speciﬁc
expertise in sea law. Article 286 of UNCLOS empowers the
Tribunal to issue binding rulings in cases where the parties
cannot arbitrate or settle their differences; and Article 287
gives parties the option of choosing their preferred means
of settling disputes. Although UNCLOS is binding on all
states as customary international law, the dispute resolu-
tion provisions, which were newly created by UNCLOS, do
not have the status of customary law, and are not binding
(see Treves, 2007). In fact, they are not necessarily binding
on signatory parties, if those parties have upon signing
deposited a declaration exempting themselves from the
dispute resolution mechanisms of UNCLOS. Thus,
customary law obliges all nations to behave within the law
of the sea, but not to accept the arbitrational provisions, or
to cede jurisdiction of its admiralty courts to international
courts.
When the Soviet Union ratiﬁed the treaty in December,
1982, it appended a declaration that includes the following:
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares that, in
accordance with article 298 of the Convention, it does
not accept the compulsory procedures entailing binding
decisions for the consideration of disputes relating to
sea boundary delimitations, disputes concerning mili-
tary activities, or disputes in respect of which the
Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the
functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United
Nations. (UNCLOS, “Declarations”)
When the new Russian Federation ratiﬁed the UNCLOS
in 1997, it issued a similar declaration, stating in part that
“. it does not accept the procedures, provided for in
Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention, entailing binding
decisions with respect to disputes concerning the inter-
pretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 of the
Convention, relating to sea boundary delimitations, or
those involving historic bays or titles; disputes concerning
military activities, including military activities by govern-
ment vessels and aircraft, and disputes concerning law-
enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign
rights or jurisdiction ."(Treves, 2007). The Islamic
Republic of Iran issued similar declarations that exempted
it from the dispute resolution mechanisms of UNCLOS. It
declined to “pronounce on the choice of procedures pur-
suant to articles 287 and 298”, and furthermore issued
a declaration concerning the status of enclosed and semi-
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laws concerning the rights of innocent passage for foreign
warships, and stated that the right of access to and from the
sea and freedom of transit of Land-locked States was
“derived frommutual agreement of States concerned based
on the principle of reciprocity” (Treves, 2007). When the
Republic of Belarus re-ratiﬁed the UNCLOS in 2006, it also
declared itself not bound by decisions for the consideration
of disputes; as did Ukraine in 1999.
The sum result of these declarations, particularly
those of the Russian Republic and Islamic Republic of
Iran, was to accept the customary rules that were
codiﬁed in the UNCLOS; to reserve judgment on its
innovative dispute resolution mechanisms; and to leave
most of the highly contentious territorial issues con-
cerning the Caspian Sea outside the jurisdiction of any
international judicial or arbitrational body. Further-
more, Russia and Iran reserved their sovereign power to
create admiralty law, either by domestic legislation or
by bi-lateral treaty-making between themselves or
multi-lateral treaties with the other Caspian states.
Despite all the UNCLOS provisions that would seem to
regulate the status of the Caspian Sea, UNCLOS did
nothing to clarify or settle issues of sovereignty over the
Caspian resources.
And what about the other Caspian states: Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan? Are they parties to the
UNCLOS as a result of the Soviet ratiﬁcation of UNCLOS, and
are they bound – or protected – by its provisions?
Remember that the Russian Federation, Belarus and
Ukraine ratiﬁed the treaty, or rather re-ratiﬁed the treaty,
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. It is
unclear whether the other Caspian states need to or not.
The controlling document here is the Vienna Convention
on Succession of States in respect of Treaties (1980), an
international convention that did not come into effect until
1996, and has only twenty-two signatory states, none of
them states concerned with the Caspian Sea or its
resources.7 Even had these states signed Vienna 1980, it is
unclear whether they would need to accede to UNCLOS
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Russia, Ukraine
and Belarus acceded to UNCLOS after independence
because they had been putatively “sovereign” prior to 1991:
Ukraine and Belarus as UN members; Russia as the
successor state to the Soviet Union. Upon accession, all
three registered declarations that they do not accept Article
298 obligatory dispute resolution. But as to the newly
independent states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan, it is unclear whether they are bound by the
Soviet ratiﬁcation of UNCLOS. Under Vienna 1980, newly-
independent states are generally not bound to maintain
treaty obligations put into force by their predecessors’
treaties in their respective territories (Damrosch, Henkin,
Murphy, & Smit, 2009, 56; Sanei, 2001, 784). This rule
came into being as ameans to protect former colonial states7 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties
(1980) for the current status of the treaty, see U.N. Treaty Repository at
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src¼TREATY&mtdsg_
no¼XXIII-2&chapter¼23&lang¼en.from the obligations imposed on them during their status
as colonial territories. Ironically, acting in its presumed role
as protector of the colonized peoples of the world, the
Soviet Union had insisted on insertion of this clause into
the treaty during its negotiation (U.N. Ofﬁcial Records,1978,
105–106). The presumption against continuance of legal
obligations is often referred to as the “clean slate rule”.
Moreover, according to the International Law Commission,
“the fundamental rule to be laid down for bi-lateral treaties
appears to be that their continuance in force after inde-
pendence is a matter of agreement between the newly-
independent State and the other State party to predecessor
State’s treaty” (Damrosch et al., 2009, 538). A newly-inde-
pendent state has the right of option to be a party to such
treaties, but not an obligation. The newly independent
states point to the clean slate doctrine to assert that since
the states had not been involved in the decision-making
process, there is no continuance of legal obligations (Sanei,
2001, 784). Yet, as noted by other scholars, the Almaty
Declaration of 1991, in which all the newly-independent
states “explicitly agreed to recognize the validity of all
international treaties and agreements signed under the
Soviet Union and honor their binding effect on subsequent
state actions,” would seem to obviate this question and
oblige all successor states to conform to the international
obligations accepted by the Soviet Union, including
UNCLOS – and the treaty obligations created by the Soviet–
Iranian Caspian pacts (Croissant & Aras, 1999, 25; see also
Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth
of Independent States).
If all this seems needlessly confusing, it highlights the
seeming absence of settled international law within the
internal borders of the former Soviet Union almost twenty
years after its dissolution. A plethora of conﬂicting inter-
national laws and treaties, and the absence of an interna-
tional court with jurisdiction to determine the status of the
Caspian Sea, leaves the bordering states at will to assert
their conﬂicting treaty rights. Each of the positions of the
various states explicated below can be legitimately asserted
to have a basis in either international law, treaty obliga-
tions, or domestic law. Without any neutral forum to settle
these questions, states are left to use the traditional tools of
diplomatic negotiation and power politics to assert the
most advantageous interpretation for themselves.
3. Iran and the Soviet–Iran treaties
The Islamic Republic of Iran argues that it is a mistake to
think of the Caspian region as a res nullius – that is, “an
object of law belonging to no state and thus open to
unilateral appropriation or occupation by the ﬁrst comer or
taker”, rejecting the view that the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.
created a legal vacuum as absurd (Mirfendereski, 1999,
246). Moreover, it has rejected the proposal of the other
littoral states that the Caspian might be classiﬁed as
a geographic sea and insists that it is an inland lake and that
the international law of the sea is not applicable to it. One of
the major reasons for such a radical view is the country’s
concern about the possible presence of the U.S. navy in the
region, since Azerbaijan has shown interest in seeing it in
the Caspian (Namazi & Farzin, 2004, 238). Iran’s legal
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treaties that it signed with the U.S.S.R. These treaties allow
Iran to assert rights to the Caspian resources greater than
those provided by UNCLOS, and to deny freedom of the seas
or the right of innocent passage on the Caspian to any non-
littoral state. On 26 February 1921 the Russian Socialist
Federal Republic and Persia (after 1935, Iran) entered into
a Treaty of Friendship that provided Persiawith some rights
to the Caspian (Folger, 2003, 534). Article 11 of the treaty
granted free shipping to both states, thus allowing Iran to
have both cargo ships and warships on the sea waters.
Moreover, a series of complementary treaties that followed
after 1921 granted Persia increased rights to navigation and
ﬁshing. The 1940 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation
speciﬁed an exclusive right of ﬁshing for the distance of ten
nautical miles from the coasts of each state (Nick, 2005,
597). As a result, all the treaties were based on a number of
premises, most importantly that the Caspian is closed to all
but Iranian and Soviet shipping, that both parties have
equal access to the Sea and equal treatment on its waters,
and that any decisions affecting the Sea and its resources
must be made jointly by them. One should take note that at
the time the treaties were signed the issue of exploitation
of the seabed and subsoil resources did not yet exist.
Consequently, there are no articles in the treaties regarding
that issue.
Much of the current legal dispute regarding the Caspian
focuses on the Soviet–Iranian treaties. Iran asserts their
continuing validity despite the dissolution of the Soviet
Union (Ghafouri, 2008, 86). This view has caused quite
a commotion among the successor states for a number of
reasons. First of all, argues Iran, there is no legal justiﬁca-
tion for the littoral states to contest the 1921 and 1940 Iran-
U.S.S.R. treaties since the countries embraced them as
a matter of general international law of state-succession
(Vienna, 1980). Secondly, the fact that on 21 December
1991, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, among
others, acceded to the Minsk Agreement and signed onto
the Almaty Declaration obligating them “to undertake their
international commitments according to the treaties and
agreements signed by the U.S.S.R”.8 Thus, in the Iranian
assessment of treaty law, the break-up of the Soviet Union
did not affect the legal or factual reality of the Iran–U.S.S.R.
treaties.
Regardless of one’s reading of the purview of the rele-
vant article of the Almaty Declaration, the Iranian argu-
ment contains premises that might prove to be its Achilles’
heel. As Dunlap notes, “[f]irst, it gives great weight to
general Soviet–Iranian treaties that make little mention of
the Caspian, and are completely silent about division or
ownership of the seabed”. Considering that the primary
concern of the littoral states is the division of the seabed
and the resources in it, the treaties appear to be useless.
“Second, [Iran] argues for a common ownership regime of8 See Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of
Independent States (1991), Agreement on Strategic Forces, Article 2. It
seems clear that the commitment to “to observe the international treaties
of the former U.S.S.R.” concerns only treaties on ballistic missiles and
reduction of armed forces; but for the Iranian view, see Namazi & Farzin,
2004, 237. 2.the Caspian’s resources when in fact such a regime is not
explicit in the treaties. Such a common ownership regime
would, therefore, have to be inferred, but neither the Soviet
Union nor Iran treated the Caspian as joint property during
the Soviet era. Third, the Soviets engaged in oil extraction
activities outside the ten-mile exclusive ﬁshing zone stip-
ulated in the treaty, with no objection from Iran. Some have
suggested that Iran’s silence about de facto divisions during
the Soviet era should preclude it from raising objections to
national divisions today. Finally, Iran has refused to recog-
nize the continued validity of the 1921 and 1940 treaties in
other areas they govern, such as security” (Dunlap, 2004,
125). However, despite all the weaknesses of Iran’s position
one cannot deny the de jure existence of the 1921 and 1940
treaties. Although the littoral states around the Caspian
may feel free to lay claims of exclusive jurisdiction over
some sectors, “the legality of such claims may be tested by
Iran as a matter of international law” (Amirahmadi, 1999,
246). The lack of a systematic approach to the issue of
competing sovereign rights of the littoral states, and the
absence of an international adjudicative body with juris-
diction, is doomed to result in chaos, with an armed conﬂict
lurking in the wings.
Another important factor that has increased the tension
between Iran, Russia and the other littoral states is the
turbulence of the relations between them going back to the
nineteenth century, when Russia fought two wars with
Persia for access to the Persian Gulf. The resulting treaties
(the 1813 Treaty of Golestan and the 1828 Treaty of Tuk-
manchai) clearly reﬂected the fact that Russia was the
victor in both wars, dictating unfavorable terms on Persia
(Namazi & Farzin, 2004, 231). For instance, only the winner
was entitled to have warships on the Caspian. When the
Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, they commenced
a radical transformation of Russia’s imperialist policies. To
improve its relationship with Persia-Iran, Russia signed the
1921 and 1940 treaties. Leaping forward to the era imme-
diately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia and
Iran became allies, defending common ownership as a legal
regime for the Caspian. For instance, in 1996 Moscow and
Tehran worked together to convince the other states that
the Caspian was just a large lake, and all the bordering
states needed the consent of the others to extract resources
from its bed (Mamedov, 2001, 237). Common ownership
was strongly advocated by both states.
Understanding Azerbaijan’s stance in the dispute
requires going back to some major events in the country’s
complicated history. First, at the end of the Russo-Persian
War 1826–1828, the Tukmanchai Treaty divided Azerbaijan
into northern and southern parts between the two parties,
placing both sectors under a long period of imperial rule. A
large part of the Azeri homeland still lies within Iran and is
home to a signiﬁcant diaspora. As a repercussion of this
historical legacy, when Azerbaijan obtained independence
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it felt extremely
threatened by its powerful neighbors and felt the urge to
form alliances with the U.S., Turkey and Georgia in order to
preserve its fragile independence, to safeguard its security
and to ensure its economic independence. Another sore
spot that has inﬂuenced the initial position of Azerbaijan is
the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict, which revealed strong
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led to the emergence of the geopolitical “triangle Moscow-
Yerevan-Tehran” in the early nineties which signiﬁcantly
enhanced the security dilemma felt by Azerbaijan (Nassibli,
2004, 158).
Since Azerbaijan did not want to be seen as Russia’s
backyard any longer, it started to seek an economic and
political foothold in the oil industry from the inception of
its sovereignty in 1991. This circumstance made it crucial
for the country to deﬁne the status of the Sea. The
cornerstone of Azerbaijan’s stance was its refusal to be
bound by the 1921 and 1940 treaties. The Azeri authorities
have heavily relied on the claim that according to the
principle of rebus sic stantibus or the fundamental change of
circumstances, which is codiﬁed in the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties under Article 62, and
also the clean slate doctrine. According to the doctrines,
particularly rebus sic stantibus, which is part of customary
international law, the dissolution of the Soviet Union
negated the 1921 and 1940 treaties between Iran and the
U.S.S.R., and the Caspian Sea must be divided among the
littoral states according to the rules of UNCLOS (Sanei, 2001,
783). Although this is a strong argument under interna-
tional law, Azerbaijan asserts additional arguments against
the Iranian claim. First, Azerbaijan points out that the 1921
and 1940 treaties are limited to shipping issues and have
nothing to do with the seabed resources. Second, it notes
that the long time exploitation of Caspian oil resources
without Iranian objections. In fact, the Azeri oil ﬁelds have
been exploited continuously since 1871, thus falling into
the category of the oldest oil ﬁelds in the world (Sneider,
1993, 6; Aqayi, 2006, 39). Finally, to create a domestic
legal foundation for its national sector, Azerbaijan unilat-
erally added article 11.2 to its 1995 Constitution: “Internal
waters of the Azerbaijan Republic, the sector of the Caspian
Sea (lake) belonging to the Azerbaijan Republic and air
space over the Azerbaijan Republic are integral parts of the
territory of the Azerbaijan Republic” (Constitution of the
Azerbaijan Republic, 1995, 59). This follows the curious
tendency for countries involved in territorial disputes to
use their constitutions to stake sovereign claims. For
instance, in the course of the South China Sea dispute,
where six parties have competed for a region rich in oil
resources, the Chinese enshrined their claims to certain
parts of the area in their national law similarly to
Azerbaijan (Duong, 2007, 1153).
4. The Russian view and political tactics
The Russian view on the legal status of the Caspian Sea
has been quite malleable since the break-down of the
Soviet Union. While the newly independent states, driven
by fear of their former ‘colonizer’, rushed to seek new
alliances in order to consolidate their sovereignty and to
boost their economies, Russia did not need Caspian oil so
much due to the availability of hydrocarbon resources
elsewhere (Antonenko, 2004, 244). In fact, Russia claimed
to have proven reserves of 60 billion barrels, nearly all of
which laid outside the Caspian region, mainly in Western
Siberia (Joyner & Walters, 2006, 179). This allowed the
country to retain its provoking attitude of a “hegemonicsuperpower surrounded by hostility” for a substantial
period of time (Peuch, 1998, 27). However, when it became
clear that the federation’s oil production had begun to fall
after 1991, the ten billion barrels of proven oil reserves in
the northern Caspian Sea triggered Russia’s interest in the
resources of the sea, often at the expense of geopolitical
considerations (Bahgat, 2002, 274).
Russia’s shifting position over the status of the Caspian
owed to internal conﬂicts, speciﬁcally clashes between
private oil companies’ interests and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, which never fully supported Russian oil companies
that tried to establish businesses in the Caspian area. The
constant tension between the Foreign Ministry and the
Ministry of Fuel and Power stemmed from their diverging
interests. As a result, in 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
had to revive the discussion of the Caspian Sea’s legal status
when oil companies started to lead negotiations on their
own, especially between Lukoil and Azerbaijan. The
Ministry of Fuel and Power did not support any attempts to
pressure Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, whose good will was
necessary for the budding business relationship. More than
that, it supported the sovereign claims of the newly inde-
pendent states to their respective national sectors, which
would allow Russia to export its scientiﬁc and technological
programs (Sanei, 2001, 761).
The divide within the Russian government became
apparent in 1994 when Azerbaijan actively commenced
negotiations on conditions for the so-called Contract of the
Century with the West. Appalled by Azerbaijan’s actions,
the Russian Foreign Ministry sent a note to the British
Embassy in Moscow expressing its disagreement by stating
that “any steps by whichever Caspian state aimed at
acquiring any kind of advantagewith regard to the area and
resources . cannot be recognized . [A]ny unilateral
actions are devoid of legal basis.” (Mehdiyoun, 2000, 185)
The Foreign Ministry followed Iran’s line of reasoning by
referring to the treaties of 1921 and 1940 and evoking the
Almaty Declaration, thus adamantly opposing the Caspian
countries that viewed the application of UNCLOS as a viable
option. Such a ﬁrm stance could be explained by the Min-
istry’s desire to restrict the new states’ ambitions to
establish contacts with the West. Moreover, the federation
had not even been initially invited to participate in the
negotiations of the Contract of the Century and joined in
only in early 1994. Thus, paradoxically enough, while the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was threatening to disrupt all
Azerbaijani operations in the Caspian due to their illegal
nature, the Ministry of Fuel and Power was assisting
Azerbaijan in those projects. Out of the two, the oil lobby
proved to be more powerful in the Russian government, as
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin met Azerbaijani President
Aliyev and reafﬁrmed the federation’s acceptance of the
Contract of the Century (Mehdiyoun, 2000, 186).
For the Foreign Ministry’s strategic plans in the early-
mid nineties, oil was not an end, but merely a means to
keep the former Soviet republics under its inﬂuence. In fact,
its policies largely prevented the successful development of
Russian private energy business in the Caspian basin. For
instance, after Azerbaijan’s active involvement in the
negotiations of the Contract of the Century, Sergei Lavrov,
permanent representative of the Russian Federation to the
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October 5, 1994, clarifying the federation’s stance regarding
the legal regime of the Caspian Sea. Lavrov asserted that
“.unilateral action in respect of the Caspian Sea is
unlawful and will not be recognized by the Russian
Federation, which reserves the right to take such measures
as it deems necessary and whenever it deems appropriate,
to restore the legal order and overcome the consequences
of unilateral actions” (Aqayi, 2006, 91). Thus, in that period,
foreign policy was reﬂecting concern about the former
Soviet borders as a continuing zone of security (Sievers,
2001, 393). Even in early 1997, the Foreign Ministry
issued a policy paper where it identiﬁed the top priorities
in the country’s international relations, especially “to
consolidate Russia’s role as a great power and one of the
centers of the multi-polar world that is taking shape” and
“to defend Russia’s territorial integrity” (Peuch, 1998, 27).
On the other hand, in 1996, the Russian ForeignMinistry
started to make concessions due to its helplessness in the
face of the country’s powerful oil companies. Its main
proposal was to grant national sovereignty over the
mineral resources within forty-ﬁve miles of each state’s
coast, with the middle area left for joint development.
However, this harmony between the opposing parties in
the Russian government revealed its ephemeral character
when the Ministry of Natural Resources allowed Lukoil to
develop a ﬁeld in the northern Caspianwithout considering
that the oil ﬁeld stretched far beyond the forty-ﬁve-mile
zone, and as a repercussion would trigger a conﬂict with
Kazakhstan (Mehdiyoun, 2000, 186).
Generally, Russia’s initial inability to reconcile all its
interests was largely due to the lack of consensus on
foreign-policy priorities among Russian political elites, the
inability of the government to oversee and coordinate
policies pursued by different agencies, and the growing
power of economic lobbies. Its desire to preserve the
exclusive character of its inﬂuence, its “informal empire” in
the Caspian region, opposed any external involvement into
the region. Thus, the ﬁrst decade for Russia brought no
progress in negotiating a new legal regime and deﬁning the
status of the Caspian. Contributing factors were the internal
turmoil within the country fueled by chaotic privatization,
the lack in expertise in the Foreign Ministry, and the Cas-
pian states’ eagerness to decrease their dependence on the
federation. Additionally, the conﬂict in Chechnya hampered
political and economic reforms and negatively affected the
stability of Russia itself. By the end of Yeltsin’s term, Rus-
sia’s position in the Caspian was weak and full of contra-
dictions. Even Iran deemed the federation as an important
but unreliable ally (Antonenko, 2004, 247).
5. Condominium principle
In the absence of clear agreement about the status of the
Caspian, or of any way to resolve the issue, the Iranians and
Russians encouraged the other littoral states to accept the
condominium principle of dividing it in the 1990s. This
principle would have given Russia and particularly Iran
greater advantages than they would enjoy under the
application of the UNCLOS principles. Under international
law, a condominium exists when two or more Statesexercise joint sovereignty over a territory or a body of
water. The condominium is used as a last resort when
efforts to resolve territorial disputes through negotiation
have failed, and is generally designed to be temporary in
nature (Samuels, 2008, 728).
Iran’s initial stance was to delimitate the Caspian
according to the principle of res communis. Were the Cas-
pian to be res communis, all Caspian states would have
rights (either positive or “anti-commons”) because the sea
would then be common heritage to the littoral states. It
could not, then, by deﬁnition, become part of the sover-
eignty of any state (Sievers, 2001, 362). Such categorization
implies that the Caspian is a shared resource that legally
cannot be privatized by any littoral state and has to remain
an object of joint usage (Mamedov, 2001, 236). Even though
Iran has made some concessions, in particular the agree-
ment to divide the Sea into ﬁve equal sectors, it persistently
contends that the 1921 and 1940 Soviet–Iranian treaties
will remain in force until a new multi-lateral convention is
agreed upon by all the ﬁve littoral states. This of course
would provide Iran with a tremendous leverage in any
negotiations, and little incentive to cede the privileges that
it gained through the Soviet–Iranian treaties.
Politically, the co-joint principles of condominium and
consensus would empower Iran in its opposition to the
Western and U.S. powers in the region. Consequently, Iran
pushed and continues to push for a legal regime that makes
the Sea exclusive to the shipping of the littoral states. One
should take note that Iran’s position, like that of the other
littoral states, has evolved over the past decade. If in the
early 1990s the Islamic Republic insisted on the condo-
minium approach to the management of the Caspian, today
it is willing to accept a division, so long as its share is
twenty percent (Mamedov, 2001, 244). This change is quite
understandable given that Iran’s share could not be
compared to that of the other states if there were
a proportionate division according to the length of its
coastline under UNCLOS. Additionally, the transformation
of Iran’s stance can be interpreted as a result of Azerbaijan’s
adamant refusal to accept shared ownership and Russia’s
desire to improve its relationship with Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan, which left Iran without a single ally. Finally, it
should be underlined that Tehran regards the militarization
of the region as an issue much more important than its
desire to receive a bigger ’slice’ of the Sea. Iran ultimately
came to accept the division of the Caspian into national
sectors, which is detrimental to its interests, just to secure
the exclusive right of shipping. Russia remained reluctant
to accept the sectional division of the Caspian for a long
time, giving in only in 1997–1998, awakened by the reali-
zation that it had been left behind in opportunities of oil
transportation when Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan began to realize projects bypassing the
federation. Hence, Russia was compelled to reject the
principle of condominium (Mamedov, 2001, 243).
The signal event in the turn-about of the Russians was
when Azerbaijan became the ﬁrst country to assert sover-
eignty over a part of the Caspian by signing the “Contract of
the Century” in Baku in 1994. The contract included thir-
teen leading oil companies (AMOCO, BP, McDermott,
UNOCAL, SOCAR, LUKOIL, Statoil, Exxon, Turkish Petrol,
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world (Azerbaijan, United States, Great Britain, Russia,
Turkey, Norway, Japan and Saudi Arabia). Note the Russian
participation in the contract, under the sponsorship of the
Ministry of Fuel and Power. To date, nearly thirty compa-
nies from fourteen different countries participate in the
development of Azerbaijani oil resources (Heydar Aliyev
Foundation, 2007). The world’s major companies have
already invested over U.S. $8 billion in exploration and
development operations in the sectors of the Caspian that
‘belong’ to Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, while more than
U.S. $100 billion are expected to be invested in the next 25–
30 years (Nassibli, 2004, 158). The main allies of Azerbaijan
in the mid-nineties were Kazakhstan (1995–1996) and
Turkmenistan (1996) who followed the republic’s recog-
nition of the sectional delimitation of the Sea due to its
beneﬁts for their own economies.
6. Bi-lateralism and multi-lateralism
Faced with the loss of valuable petroleum resources and
its virtual diplomatic monopoly on the territory of the
former Soviet Union, Russia was compelled to adopt a new
strategy of signing bi-lateral agreements with the newly
independent states bordering the Caspian. The ﬁrst Cas-
pian-related bi-lateral agreement was signed between
Russia and Kazakhstan on July 6, 1998, and its Protocol was
adopted on 13 May 2002 (Ghafouri, 2008, 88). It became
the ﬁrst interstate agreement in the post-Soviet sphere that
dealt with the division of the Sea’s northern seabed. The
change of leadership in the Kremlin intensiﬁed the move
toward bi-lateralism. Vladimir Putin authorized and
chaired a special meeting of the Russian Security Council on
April 21, 2000 in order to reassess the Russian role in the
Caspian region (Mamedov, 2001, 246). Putin undertook the
task of reconciling the diverse national interests in the Sea.
The meeting resulted in a dramatic shift of focus from the
predominantly political considerations of the nineties
toward economic interests. The old strategy of winning
inﬂuence by political and military means was abandoned
for a more pragmatic approach. The main Russian objec-
tives identiﬁed during the meeting were the deﬁnition of
the legal status of the Caspian Sea, remaining the key
diplomat power in the region, and trying to achieve a ﬁve-
party consensus through a system of bi-lateral agreements.
Russia’s proactive position has proved to be fairly efﬁcient
and it has signiﬁcantly contributed to the amelioration of
the federation’s image in the eyes of the other littoral
states, excluding of course Iran. Subsequently in August
2001, Putin held a series of bi-lateral meetings with most of
the leaders of the former Soviet republics to discuss the
division of the Caspian Sea (Folger, 2003, 545). The year
2002 was crucial in terms of the evolution of the legal
regime in the Caspian since hostilities between Azerbaijan
and Iran in 2001 moved Azerbaijan to strengthen its posi-
tion in the Caspian and shore up ties to its Russian
neighbor. Russia and Azerbaijan entered into a bi-lateral
agreement in September 2002, under which both states
agreed to delimitate the seabed into national sectors, based
on the Soviet Union’s administrative borders in 1970.
In May 2003, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan enteredinto a trilateral agreement on the Caspian Sea division
where they accepted the “modiﬁed median line” method
of delimitation (Joyner & Walters, 2006, 190; Ghafouri,
2008, 88).
The new Russian strategy required a new legal approach
to the Caspian. The bi-lateral agreements were based on
a division of seabed resources along a median line equi-
distant from each country’s shores, much in line with
UNCLOS principles. According to this technique, the width
of exclusive economic zones is resolved by drawing
a median line parallel and equidistant from the coastlines
of states that lie opposite one another. The length of the
exclusive economic zone is calculated to run proportionally
along a state’s territorial coast, thus dividing the sea into
separate sectors. The samemethod was applied in the 1958
Convention on the Continental Shelf to divide overlapping
sections of the shelf between states with adjacent and
opposite coastlines, and has since been applied in various
international maritime boundary disputes, including
a recent delineation of the Red Sea between Yemen and
Eritrea (Joyner &Walters, 2006, 191). Thus, according to the
modiﬁed median line method, Russia has 18.5% of the
seabed; Kazakhstan receives 29%, Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan possess close to 19% each, thus leaving Iran
with only 14% (Antonenko, 2004, 251).
While Russia moved closer to the Azerbaijani and
Kazakhstani positions by accepting division of the seabed
into proportional national sectors, it continued to insist on
common management of the surface waters, preserving
free navigation and common ecological standards for the
littoral states (Antonenko, 2004, 250). This innovative
approach is called the “common waters, divided bottom”
principle. It secures each state’s right to a sector of the
Caspian seabed, while excluding rights for foreign shipping
and allowing each littoral state to pursue its own security
concerns. The Russian sponsorship of bi-lateral agreements
brought signiﬁcant beneﬁts to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
It incorporated the UNCLOS concept most important to
their interests – division of the seabed into proportional
national sectors (Aqayi, 2006, 42). It provided a solution to
the lack of a clear title to the Caspian Sea that had signiﬁ-
cantly obstructed the task of attracting foreign investment
to Azerbaijan’s energy projects (Mehdiyoun, 2000, 184).
Kazakhstan has come to support the Russian process for
similar reasons (Aqayi, 2006, 42).
At the moment, there is a general agreement among
Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan on both the principle
and the method of dividing rights to the seabed and the oil
beneath it. The array of bi-lateral treaties that has been
signed by them covers the northern part of the sea, effec-
tively dividing it into Russian, Azerbaijani, and Kazakhstani
national sectors. It is important to note that Russia still
considers a ﬁve-party consensus as the only legally
acceptable mechanism for deﬁning the ﬁnal status of the
Sea; what did change is the way of achieving that goal.
Instead of radically defending its argument like Iran, Russia
simply signed the bi-lateral treaties, thus adopting a step-
by-step approach while also trying to settle disputes over
offshore oilﬁelds. Yet without a full consensus, the legal
power of those treaties is not entirely clear since it depends
on whether the old Soviet–Iranian treaties remain in force,
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solved along with the Soviet Union in 1991, or if they never
effectively governed ownership of the Caspian, then the bi-
lateral treaties should be governing law in the Caspian. On
the other hand, if the old Soviet era treaties are still in force,
Iran may have justice on its side.
It is important to note that the Russian legal justiﬁcation
for the common waters approach lies in classifying the
Caspian Sea as an inland lake, the principle most dear to
Iran. This approach excludes the Caspian from the rules of
UNCLOS, and offers no access to non-littoral states (Sanei,
2001, 760). Russia relied on a number of historic exam-
ples in settling disputes over inland lakes, for instance the
series of bi-lateral treaties between the United States and
Canada that establish the legal status of the Great Lakes, or
the establishment of the regime on Lake Constance by
Germany, Austria and Switzerland (Folger, 2003, 551). In
each case, the treaties were useful to deﬁne their lakes’
borders, navigational rights and overﬂight provisions, and
to establish a joint commission to oversee air and water
quality issues. Of course, none of these waters were salt
waters that were commonly referred to as seas. Thus, in the
short term, the northern-state treaties can be characterized
as beneﬁcial for establishing sovereign rights within the
Caspian region. Also, such conditions provide incentives for
companies that are generally unwilling to invest much
capital in a territory covered by no clear legal regime.
If we were to assess Russia’s “divided bottom, common
waters” approach, it could be concluded that the federation
will likely be the biggest winner (Dunlap, 2004, 126). First,
due to its proactive involvement in formulating and
securing a legal regime in the Caspian, Russia will be
considered a stabilizing force in the area. Second, division
of the seabed into national sectors will help inﬂuential
Russian oil companies pursue development of recently
discovered reserves in the Russian sector. Finally, the
“common waters” approach will give Moscow complete
freedom to patrol the Caspian and ﬁght ‘crime and
terrorism’ as it deems necessary (Joyner & Walters, 2006,
207). In addition to being such a friendly neighbor, Russia
has come forward as a mediator of the disputes that have
arisen between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Iran (Folger,
2003, 545). It has also been promoting the idea of a regional
organization to oversee the affairs in the Caspian.
Despite Azerbaijan’s caution in its negotiations with
Russia, it came to accept the federation’s solution as
a guarantee of its sovereign rights to its sector, which is
precisely its main objective. Undoubtedly, Azerbaijan
would prefer a multi-lateral legal regime codifying the
seabed boundaries, but given its interest in securing its
rights sooner rather than later, and Iran’s menacing
aggression, a system of bi-lateral treaties may be the best
solution for the country at this point of the dispute’s
development (Dunlap, 2004, 127). As a point of interest, in
order to reinforce its independence from Russia in light of
such a tight cooperation, Azerbaijan seeks the United
States’ full support due to the its desire to block any
involvement of Iran in the process of deciding when and
how to develop the Caspian resources. Thus, in the process
of deﬁning the legal regime in the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan
seems to be balancing between twomajor powers, trying toreinforce its claims to independence, while also seeking
friendly cooperation in the region in order to ensure the
successful development of its oil reserves.
Russia’s proposal for resolving the Caspian’s legal status
is very likely to emerge as the deﬁning legal framework for
the sea. A major problem with this solution is that the
proposed legal regime is overly dependent on the preser-
vation of good relations among the littoral states in the
geopolitical arena, thus making this approach similar to the
Russian traditional dominating style of pursuing its prag-
matic national interests in a disguised manner (“informal
empire”). One can easily spot Russia’s desire to maintain its
veto power over underwater pipeline construction and to
navigate its military ships throughout the Caspian region.
There have been many concerns that Russia’s approach is,
in fact, a Trojan horse that would open the door to the
country’s unlimited military control of the area. Ironically
enough, after the immense amount of time and money
spent on the process of negotiation, the “divided bottom,
commonwaters” approach is essentially a political solution
to a legal problem (Bahgat, 2002, 290). It will help to
develop cooperation and to get the oil ﬂowing, but in the
longer run a number of conﬂicts, possibly between Iran and
Russia, may undermine the political foundation of the
Russian plan. The bi-lateral approach also seems to split
the region into opposing camps of winners and losers. The
relationship between Russia, Iran and Turkmenistan has
signiﬁcantly deteriorated and the federation is no longer
regarded as a fair mediator by those states. This has led to
the rise in Iranian aggression since after Russia’s “betrayal”,
it was left with a share of only 14% of the seabed. Conse-
quently, Iran has rushed to support Turkmenistan’s
dissatisfaction with the status quo.
Although Iran recognizes the urgent necessity to
formulate a new legal regime in the region in light of the
collapse of the Soviet Union, it decisively condemns the bi-
lateral treaties signed between Russia, and Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan (Mehdiyoun, 2000, 182). The negative impli-
cations of the Russian “divided bottom, common waters”
approach have caused conﬂict andwill likely continue to do
so, since the strategy denies Iran key economic opportu-
nities. The plan effectively excludes the Islamic Republic
from any signiﬁcant deposits of the Caspian’s oil and gas.
The fourteen percent share allocated to it contains the least
proven oil and gas reserves and the deepest water. Tension
will also escalate because the bi-lateral treaty-making by
Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan is rapidly closing off
Iran’s inﬂuence in the Caspian region. Iran, paradoxically,
also fears instability in the region. Speciﬁcally, Iran’s
concerns about the tacit U.S. support for Russia’s legal
solution for the Caspian and the possibility of a large U.S.
military presence on Iran’s border will heighten feelings of
isolation and insecurity in Tehran (Dunlap, 2004, 129).
Thus, although Iran may win some concessions in a ﬁnal
agreement on the status of the Caspian, given the current
situation, that scenario looks unlikely.
Since Iran argues that the Soviet-era treaties have not
lost their validity, it has repeatedly suggested that
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan should suspend
their oil and gas producing activities in the Caspian until
a newmulti-lateral agreement is reached, and it has shown
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exploded in 2001, when two British Petroleum (BP) oil
research ships commenced operations based on an Azer-
baijani contract in an area of the Caspian that would be
within Iranian waters if Iran acquired a 20% share of the
Sea. Importantly, prior to July 2001, it had generally been
accepted that this area belonged to Azerbaijan and, more-
over, Iran hadn’t expressed any disagreement when
Azerbaijan signed an array of oil contracts with interna-
tional companies. However, in July 2001, an Iranian
gunboat chased two BP survey ships from a disputed oil
ﬁeld (Ghafouri, 2008, 93). BP immediately suspended all
activity under its contract with Azerbaijan in the disputed
oil ﬁeld. Both the United States and Russia adamantly
criticized the Iranian action. The incident reinforced Iran’s
isolation, and the other Caspian states have overtly aligned
themselves with Russia. Following the unsuccessful April
2002 Caspian Summit in Turkmenistan, at which Iran alone
insisted on an equal division of the sea, President Putin
decided to commence large scale military exercises on the
Caspian in August 2002. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan also
took part in the exercises, but Iran was excluded (Dunlap,
2004, 124). It is important to realize that the Iran-
Azerbaijan confrontation is a conﬁrmation of how the
murkiness of the present legal regime, or its absence, could
be used to force concessions from the other Caspian states,
and that the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea is
a threat to the overall security in the region.
At this point one might start arguing that since negoti-
ations have produced few tenable results, there is a need
for some form of outside involvement to bring about
a solution to the dispute. The refusal of all parties to the
dispute to sign on to the UNCLOS dispute resolution clau-
ses, and the refusal of some to even recognize the Caspian
as a sea, means that there is no recognized international
forum to resolve the issue. The need for mediation, though,
is hampered by the fact that the United States stands out as
the most inﬂuential power-broker in the region with the
capacity to mediate, a contingency that the Iranians fore-
most, and the Russians, would not likely accept. During the
1990s, the United States began to push its involvement in
the Caspian region by stating that the Caspian is a “region of
its national strategic interests”. (Rahr, 2001, 80; Folger,
2003, 548) The United States even discussed with Azeri
President Heydar Aliyev the possibility of locating a U.S.
military base in Azerbaijan. The Iranians see the West and
the U.S. as backing Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan because oil
companies have already invested heavily in the region. In
particular, the U.S. has openly supported the Azerbaijani
position of the median line division, which would provide
the Azeri government with great oil resources that it could
export to Western Europe, away from Iran and the Persian
Gulf. In fact, the United States has been accused of pitting
the littoral states against Iran. Consequently, despite the
clear need for a third-party mediator, the United States is
not the best choice because of its lack of neutrality.
7. Conclusion, by way of a pipeline
The seemingly irresolvable status of the Caspian Sea
leads to a set of paradoxes that, yet more paradoxically,have allowed for productive progress. One can conclude
from the above that the Caspian is both a sea and a lake or
neither a sea nor a lake. It is abundantly clear is that almost
twenty years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
internal space of the former socialist mega-state does not
function within international law, and that the tools of
informal empire: protection that shades into coercion;
negotiation and power politics instead of international rule
of law; and great power competition over the resources of
small and weak states; are the rule for the region.
Yet to allow ourselves one more ﬁnal paradox, this
situation has worked to the advantage of the small states,
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, to the hindrance of the Russian
Federation, and to the distinct disadvantage of Iran.
Azerbaijan, which initially insisted that the Caspian is a sea
that must function under the UNCLOS, has proﬁted by the
Caspian’s uncertain status as a lake on its surface, and a sea
beneath. Russia has achieved some of its goals, foremost
control of the surface waters, through this status, and it is
rushing to catch up to Azerbaijan in its capacity to exploit
petroleum resources. Iran, which insists that the Caspian is
a lake which must be divided according to terms of the
Soviet–Iran Treaties, ﬁnds itself excluded from both the
seabed resources and most of the surface by the legal
vacuum created by its intransigence. Yet ultimately, until
the Caspian is brought fully under the umbrella of the
international rule of law, these outcomes will remain
imperiled by changing circumstances.
Azerbaijan has been able to tap into the rich oil ﬁelds
that would be part of its EEZ under UNCLOS. It has done so
under the protection of its bi-lateral treaties with Russia.
But it must also transport those resources to wealthy
western markets greedy for free-ﬂowing oil and natural
gas, and here it does not enjoy the patronage of Russia or
the protection of UNCLOS. After the break-up of the Soviet
Union, the newly independent states had no choice but to
export oil through the old Soviet pipeline infrastructure,
which ran over Russian territory, and whose nexuses were
under Russian control. Since during the Soviet period the
longest and most technically advanced pipelines were built
to transport oil from Siberia to Western Russia and beyond,
the infrastructure in the Caspianwas poorly developed and
designed for domestic purposes within the U.S.S.R. The old
pipelines were not able to transport the increasing volume
of oil produced by the newly independent states. Russia
was initially able to exert hegemony over the resources of
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan through the old
pipelines, thus preserving its leverage in the region by
assuming full control of cutting off oil and gas ﬂows, re-
routing ﬂows in order to force concessions, or by enforcing
exorbitant tariffs on the transit countries. In an extreme
instance, high-quality Azerbaijani oil pumped into the
Baku-Novorossiisk pipeline was replaced by very poor
quality Russian oil, causing disasterous export income
losses for Azerbaijan (Sanei, 2001, 741). Russia for some
time perceived any oil that does not go through the
Novorossiisk system as a political failure preventing the
expansion of its inﬂuence (Mizzi, 1996, 493). Thus the new
states were anxious to start building new pipelines and
establishing permanent markets outside the Caspian,
especially considering that world oil powers, lured by
H. Zimnitskaya, J. von Geldern / Journal of Eurasian Studies 2 (2011) 1–14 13cheap oil and the Sea’s strategic location, rushed to the
Caspian region to stake out their political and economic
interests.
Themost important Caspian pipeline diplomatic issue in
the last decade has been the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline project that started to gain momentum in the late
nineties when, on 18 November 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and Turkey signed an intergovernmental agreement in
support of the pipeline. The project’s purpose was to
transport oil from the Caspian Sea to theWest. The U.S. was
one of the major supporters, seeking non-OPEC oil without
having to deal with Russia. Its desire to diversify its energy
supply and bolster the independence of the former Soviet
states in the region has led the U.S. to become an overt
supporter of multiple pipelines to transport Caspian oil to
Western markets. The U.S. viewed the BTC pipeline as
a logical channel to direct the newly independent states’
desire to obtain control over their oil exports, boosting
their economies in light of a soaring demand for oil, and
strengthening their fragile sovereignty in the face of the
Russian pipeline monopoly of Transneft (Cornell & Starr,
2005, 31). The BTC pipeline primarily sought to beneﬁt
Azerbaijan, Georgia, NATO’s ally Turkey and the U.S. itself.
Russia initially resisted construction of the BTC pipeline
and insisted on expanding the existing oil pipe system to
the north. However, the active development of the project
made Russia take it as a signal that the country’s hegemony
would not go unquestioned and sooner or later its imperial
ambitions would have to be relinquished. It was left with
no choice but to adjust its position, and give up its struggle
to block the BTC pipeline (Dunlap, 2004, 122). By proposing
the “divided bottom, shared waters” approach, Russia
sought to preserve at least some degree of its declining
control over the newly independent states. As mentioned
before, the major reason for this concession was President
Putin’s new direction in the negotiation process that aimed
to maximize Russia’s share of economic wealth and diplo-
matic inﬂuence in the Caspian (Mamedov, 2001, 246).
Moreover, Russian oil companies forced the Russian
Foreign Ministry to neutralize its policies so that Russian
companies could continue their own extraction activities in
the Caspian.
Once opened in May 2005, the BTC pipeline became the
largest export pipeline in the world, worth U.S.$2.9 billion
and spanning 1040 miles of rough terrain (Ghafouri, 2008,
93). In fact, in the process of planning the construction of
the BTC pipeline, multinational companies agreed to
choose a more environmentally harmful, expensive route
as a result of the need to by-pass Russia, Iran and Armenia.
Nevertheless, the corridor of this pipeline is considered to
be strategically unique for the direct connection of oil ﬁelds
in the land-locked Caspian Sea to deep-water ports in the
Mediterranean, thus providing a greater capacity for access
to markets. The implications for Europe are of tremendous
importance in terms of attaining diversiﬁed access to
energy supplies and having strategic access to the very
heart of Central Eurasia. It explains why cooperation with
NATO and the EU is located at the top of foreign policy
priorities of the newly independent states. Since some EU
member-states have been totally dependent on Russian gas
and oil, particularly in Central, Eastern, and South-EasternEurope, they rejoice at the possibility of having another
route for resources (Cornell & Starr, 2005, 28). Their posi-
tion was made even ﬁrmer by the natural gas crisis of the
winter of 2008–2009, when Russian pipelines across
Ukrainian territory were cut off. The BTC pipeline ﬁts
perfectly into the set of major reforms planned in the
European energy sector, seeking the establishment of
a competitive market of multiple operators with the
intention to have varied options of delivery routes. Such
diversiﬁcation of supply routes in Europe will force Russian
monopolists to implement long-awaited reforms. Inter-
estingly, the engine driving the construction of all those
new routes is precisely the inﬂexible behavior of the
Russian state monopolies, Gazprom and Transneft. Thus,
Russia has been caught in its own trap.
The vacuum of international law that has allowed for
a solution advantageous to the new independent states and
for their western customers should not be too exuberantly
celebrated. The circuitous route of the pipeline has already
caused environmental damage in once rich landscapes, and
the absence of an international regulation apparatus
promises more in the future. The host countries of the
pipeline cannot implement adequate regulation them-
selves. One should keep inmind that there is a distinct form
of legal regime that governs such constructions. For the
moment, there are two components comprising the BTC
regulatory regime: the Inter-Governmental Agreement
(IGA) between the three states involved, and an array of
Host Government Agreements (HGAs) between the states
and the BP-led oil consortium (Joyner & Walters, 2006,
167). Both have triggered a substantial wave of criticism,
with HGAs being the main target, since they take prece-
dence over domestic legislation and allow large oil interests
to avoid standard legislative regimes for oil and gas
exploitation and environmental protection (Waters, 2004,
405). Originally, such agreements were signed to reduce
the risk of investing in an unstable region by insulating
companies from inefﬁciency or corruption in government
and the legal system. They cover many legal aspects from
“no-nationalization” to extensive land and water rights for
the consortium, and a pledge not to interfere with the
operation of the pipeline. The agreements also require
“monetary compensation” from the host governments if
their actions hinder the project’s “economic equilibrium”
(Joyner & Walters, 2006, 168). Since it is explicitly said in
the clause about the non-interference provision that the
host government may not intervene on environmental or
health and safety grounds except as an exceptional and
temporary measure where the threat level is unreasonable,
the HGAs have been perceived by many as threats to
national sovereignty. The Turkish part of the pipeline has
been called “a strip running the entire length of the
country, where BP is the effective government” (Waters,
2004, 406).
These problems, and the instability that threatens both
the exploitation of Caspian fuel resources and their ship-
ment around the globe, will remain until the legal status of
the Caspian is resolved. An international legal regime that
classiﬁes the Caspian as a sea, and places it within the
purview of UNCLOS and the international rule of law,
would provide the greatest and most permanent stability.
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Iran, continue to insist, each for their own reasons, that the
Caspian is a lake; and the lesser states have found that this
legal uncertainty can work to their advantage now that the
BTC pipeline is in place. The western powers which might
exert diplomatic pressure to bring the internal space of the
former Soviet Unionwithin the international rule of law no
longer have any advantage to do so, now that high-quality
Azerbaijani oil is ﬂowing through the pipeline. It will be
a long time before any party will say with certainty
whether the Caspian Sea is a sea, and a longer time before
they recognize that it does indeed matter.References
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